Random post-reading thoughts

I just got done reading A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, by Alistair Horne, a recommended history of France's counterinsurgency war in Algeria. It's an easy read, though I found the last 15% of the book covering France's painful, prolonged withdrawal from Algeria slow going. Algeria is often referenced as a case study in counterinsurgency, particularly with regard to Iraq and Afghanistan these days. Some unvetted thoughts on the comparison:

Reassuring thoughts:

1) No colonists: The most important "asset" the United States has is the absence of a significant colonial population of citizens with a deep committment to making Iraq or Afghanistan into an American state. The Algerian pieds noirs were repeatedly their own worst enemies in Mr. Horne's history, making outrageous demands upon the French government and shattering any hope for a compromise peace with the non-European Algerians.

2) The availability of a "third force": The French repeatedly attempted to build an alternative Algerian government to negotiate with, as opposed to the hard-line demands of the F.L.N. organization. This ambition was repeatedly frustrated, not least by the actions of the French themselves. I found the description of De Gaulle's snubbing of a limited peace offer by the commanders of an important sector of the Algerian insurgency particularly affecting. By contrast, American commanders seem to be turning in favor of concluding local peace agreements where possible.

3) The unified nature of the Algerian resistance, as opposed to the fractured nature of our opposition in Iraq and Afghanistan: During the Algerian war, internal F.L.N. disputes were well concealed from the general public. This united front allowed the F.L.N. to gradually wear down the French negotiating position to the point where De Gaulle was forced to concede almost all of his demands in the hope of gaining a face-saving withdrawal from Algeria. In Iraq, at least, the opposition seems much less organized than the iron hand the F.L.N. exercised over the Algerian war effort.

4) The professionalism of the American officer class: I had no idea that critical units and officers of the French Army had rebelled against the French government and formed their own clandestine terror organizations. The likelihood that this will or could happen in the current conflict seems negligible.

Alarming thoughts:

1) Tactical military victory is inadequate: The French achieved near total victory over the Algerian insurgents in the field. They won the Battle of Algiers. They enjoyed much greater intelligence access to the thoughts of their enemy, drawing on officers with long experience in colonial Algeria. The French had access to experienced officers who had just been defeated by an insurgent enemy in Indochina and were determined not to suffer defeat a second time. Elite French units enjoyed almost complete freedom to detain, torture, and secretly assassinate suspected insurgents. The French were able to obtain near-complete isolation of insurgents operating in the interior of Algeria from outside aid. Unlike the Vietnamese, the Algerian insurgent never fielded heavy artillery, an air force, tanks, or other modern weaponry. At its greatest extent, France deployed over 600,000 troops to Algeria over a much shorter logistical train. None of this altered the final Algerian strategic victory.

2) The advantage of political unity: Nothing was as heartening to the F.L.N. or as demoralizing to the French as the appearance of Algerian political unity and French political disharmony. As long as the Algerians could create the impression that they were unified and that the French would eventually negotiate on their terms, the war would continue and the Algerians would inch closer to victory. More than ever, I am convinced that we require a unified defense policy that will remain the same regardless of changes in administration.

3) The reduced efficiency of the French Army as it became increasingly clear that the French government was asking them to risk their lives in order to save face: It is difficult to ask soldiers to die for anything less than victory. By defining victory too high (the total collapse of the F.L.N., the preservation of a pied noir colonial state in Algeria) the eventual dissatisfaction with the attainable political goals led to a minor rebellion against the French government, the forced dissolution of some of France's most effective counterinsurgency units, and the imprisonment or exile of some of France's most effective officers.